Indiana Philosophical Association

Fall 2024 Meeting at Marian University – Indianapolis. 8-9 November 2024

Meeting Program

Friday, November 8	Session 1 Evans Center 131	Session 2 Evans Center 134
9:00 – 9:30	*Registration – Evans Center Atrium*	
9:30-11:30	**Moral Knowledge & Moral Education** Chair: Joseph Gamache	**Logic & Metaphysics** Chair: James Murphy
9:30-10:20am

Speaker: Comments: | Aristotle on Complete Living

Zachary Biondi University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign Comments: Brandon Rdzak | Logical Commitment

Matthew Carlson Wabash College |
| 10:30-11:20am

Speaker: Comments | On the Disclosure of the Moral Values in the Arts: A Value-Realist Account

Keaton Jahn Boston University Comments: Neal Baird | Naturalism for Constructivists. Or, Constructivism for Naturalists?

James Ewing University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign Comments: Graham Renz |
| 11:30-1:00pm | *Lunch and Business Meeting of the IPA* | |
| 1:00-3:00 | **Normative Ethics** Chair: Joshua Paschal | **Grief & Blame** Chair: James Ewing |
| 1:00-1:50pm

Speaker: Comments: | A Novel Framework for the Wrongness of Killing

Tania Aiyar University of California, Davis Comments: James Murphy | Trapped in the present: the unreasonable self-blame in grief and other places

Haodong Lyu University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign Comments: Brandon Rdzak |
| 2:00-2:50pm

Speaker: Comments: | Three Arguments for the 'Ought' Implies 'Can' Principle

Seungchul Yang University of Nebraska, Lincoln Comments: Brian Johnson | Why is Persistent Grief Not Irrational?

Eunhong Lee University of Nebraska, Lincoln Comments: Haodong Lyu |
| 3:00-6:00pm | **Plenary Session (Evans Center 150 [Lecture Hall 1])** | |
| 3:00-3:10pm | Presentation of the Graduate Paper Prize to Keaton Jahn | |

3:15-4:05pm	*Philosophy as a Way of Life* TBD Justin Christy, University of Notre Dame
4:15-6:00pm	*Keynote Address* "The Abdication of Philosophy, 65 Years On: A Status Report" Aaron Preston, Valparaiso University
6:00pm	*Dinner*

Saturday, November 9	**Session A** Evans Center 131	**Session B** Evans Center 134
9:00 – 9:30	*Registration – Evans Center Atrium*	
9:30-12:30am	**Mind, Language, and Ethics** Chair: Brian Johnson	**Explanation**
9:30-10:20am Speaker: Comments:	Debunking the Function(s) of Moral Cognition **Noah Davis McKay** **Purdue University** **Comments: Joshua Paschal**	Against Explanatory Orthodoxy: All Predictions are Explanations **Joseph Blado** **University of Notre Dame** **Comments: Cory Wright**
10:30-11:20am Speaker: Comments	Misgendering, Contextualism, and Disagreement **James Murphy** **IU Bloomington** **Comments: James Ewing**	Filling in the Details about Explanatory Abstraction **Cory Wright** **Cal State Long Beach** **Comments**: Seungchul Yang
11:30-12:25pm Speaker: Comments:	Living a meaningful life in Virtual Reality: Responding to all the popular objections using David Chalmers' works **Kiet Nguyen** **Franklin and Marshall College** **Comments: James Ewing**	Defective to be Effective-Conceptual Defects as Parts of the Cognitive Economy **Jiusi Guo** **University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign** **Comments**: Matthew Carlson

IPA Executive Officers 2024-2025:

President	Joseph Gamache, Marian University
Vice President	Brian Johnson, Purdue University
Secretary/Treasurer	Samuel Cody Bennett, Purdue

Registration and Venue Information

Registration: There will be a registration desk in the lobby outside the conference room. Registration is also possible online here. Registration fees are $20.00 for faculty and $10.00 for graduate students; undergraduates are welcome to attend the conference at no charge. When prompted to "add a note" on the confirmation page, please enter your name and professional

affiliation. If you are paying registration fees for more than one conference participant, please include the names and professional affiliations of everyone you would like to register. (https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=UDJ8U7UKC7RPE)

Hotel recommendations:
1. Courtyard by Marriott, 6315 Crawfordsville Rd, Speedway, IN (has a restaurant). The IPA has requested a courtesy hold on a small block of rooms at this hotel. Use the following registration link to book this hotel, but be aware that supply is limited: Reservation-Link (marriott.com).
2. Hilton Garden Inn, 6930 Intech Blvd., Indianapolis, IN (has a restaurant)
3. Candlewood Suites, 7455 Woodland Drive, Indianapolis, IN

There are, of course, many other options in the city.

Parking: Parking is tight on the campus of Marian University. Fortunately, there is a large, underutilized, campus parking lot that is located near the building in which the conference is taking place (about a three-minute walk). The lot in question is on the southwest corner of 30th Street and Cold Spring Road, adjacent to a BP gas station. Click here for a campus map. The recommended parking lot is #1 on this map, and the Evans Center is #21.

Dining: On campus dining options include the Dining Commons (#13 on the map), Chick-fil-A (in Alumni Hall, #5 on the map), and Subway (in the Norman Center, #24 on the map). There isn't much dining in the immediate vicinity of Marian, but there are many options once you drive about 10-15 minutes off campus. These include Guggman Haus Brewing Co., off 16th Street (a frequent gathering place for Marian faculty), a cluster of restaurants in Speedway (e.g., Big Woods, Barbeque and Bourbon, Dawson's on Main), a cluster of restaurants in Broad Ripple, and on Mass. Ave downtown. We have allocated 90 minutes for lunch to accommodate drive times.

Abstracts of Papers

Aristotle on Complete Living – Zachary Biondi
Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* is about human happiness, *eudaimonia*. The account of happiness begins in the first lines of the text, leading to the *ergon* ('work' or 'function') argument in I.7. Book X, particularly chapters 4 and 7, is the final stage in Aristotle's account of happiness. The paper argues that X.4, when paired with Aristotle's previous comments on happiness, presents his full account of how to live the good life. It sets out an interpretation of X.4, particularly the distinction between complete and incomplete activities and the account of pleasure. The key claim is that Aristotle takes living to be a complete activity—a claim that has

profound implications for happiness or living well. The result is that living *well*, with its characteristic pleasure, is the whole of happiness in a single moment.

Logical Commitment – Matthew Carlson

Much of the literature in the epistemology of logic presupposes that our inferential practices commit us to accepting various logical principles, but this presupposition has received little explicit consideration in its own right. I aim to rectify this by achieving two goals in this paper. First, I argue that by making a deductive inference a person is thereby committed to accepting an associated logical principle. Second, I develop a criterion by means of which we can determine specifically which logical principles a person's inferential practices commit them to accepting. To achieve the second goal, I draw out some important features of Quine's criterion of ontological commitment, and use these to develop a parallel criterion of logical commitment. On this criterion, S is committed to accepting principle P by making inference I if and only if S's account of why I is a good inference generalizes to any instance of P.

On The Disclosure of Moral Values In The Arts: A Value-Realist Account – Keaton Jahn

Influenced by Max Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann's Ethics theorizes an "axiological" dimension of Being populated by ideal objects he calls "values." Like mathematical objects, they are essentially atemporal and immaterial, but can be "actualized" in the spatio-temporal world. However, we perceive values through a unique faculty of "value-feeling." Within this framework, I offer an account of why and how art is uniquely equipped to disclose moral values. In Part I, I contend that while moral values inhere only in persons and their acts, artifacts can disclose moral values whether or not they actualize them. In Part II, I argue that they do so primarily by facilitating acts of imagination whose objects instantiate moral values. In Part III, drawing on Dietrich von Hildebrand's and Edith Stein's theories of affectivity, I proceed to argue that even non-representational artworks can disclose moral values by simulating the affective states appropriate to their perception.

Naturalism for Constructivists. Or, Constructivism for Naturalists? – James Ewing

There has been a growing interest in giving metaphysical explanations of why things are right or wrong in terms of ground (Rosen 2017a, 2017b, Chilovi & Wodak 2022, Maguire 2015, 2017). An important question in these debates regards the issue of whether ethical naturalism or non-naturalism is correct, that is, whether or not the moral facts are brought about completely by natural facts. After setting up the debate, I will give an argument for ethical naturalism inspired by contemporary constructivist accounts in metaethics. This argument is the first part of a larger project of developing a metaphysically robust account of naturalism for constructivists, although, as we will see, the account may be of interest also to naturalists in virtue of its constructivistic features.

A Novel Framework for the Wrongness of Killing – Tanya Aiyar
Many of us have the following intuitions: (1) Some animals are more wrong to kill than others, forming an animal hierarchy. (2) For some species, killing a young adult is worse than killing an old one. (3) Most humans are equally wrong to kill. But finding a plausible framework for reconciling these intuitions has proven difficult, leading many philosophers to abandon one or more of them. I offer a plausible framework in this paper. I categorize moral status accounts into Stable Accounts, which ground moral status in features that do not vary much within a species, and Variable Accounts, which ground moral status in features which vary considerably within a species. I then propose a model for combining these, such that the Stable Account gains increasing weight up the animal hierarchy. This is an adaptable framework which provides a general reconciliation of the three intuitions.

Trapped in the present: the unreasonable self-blame in grief and other places – Haodong Lyu
We often blame ourselves when we are not blameworthy. This unreasonable self blame can be found on many occasions. Though unreasonable self-blame is widespread, it has received little discussion. In this paper, I will illustrate such unreasonable self-blame with more detailed examples and explain why it arises by appealing to one egocentric cognitive bias: the hot-cold empathy gap. This bias says that we tend to model the psychological states of our past selves as the states we are in now. Being influenced by the hot-cold empathy gap implies that the perspective from which we evaluate our past beliefs and actions is trapped in the present. It is from this perspective that we misperceive our past unblameworthy beliefs and actions as blameworthy. At the end of this paper, I also consider how the existence of the hot cold empathy gap would impact accounts of interpersonal blame.

Three Arguments for the 'Ought' Implies 'Can' Principle - Seungchul Yang
This paper engages in the debate over the truth of the 'ought' implies 'can' principle (OIC). It offers (i) an interpretation of OIC, proposing that reasons for infeasible actions are always attenuated to the extent that they have zero weight, due to the fact of the infeasibility, thereby entailing that reasons for infeasible actions can never be decisive; and (ii) three arguments supporting this interpretation of OIC. These arguments are based, respectively, on the three concepts: the transmission of reasons, the rational requirement of enkrasia, and the deontic dilemma. In each argument, this paper shows that denying OIC creates difficulties with these concepts, whereas they align well with the acceptance of OIC.

Why Is Persistent Grief Not Irrational? – Eunhong Lee
Berislav Marušić (2022) takes the psychological criterion distinguishing persistent grief from normal grief based on its duration, seeing persistent grief as a mental disorder. Given this criterion, he argues that an agent's having a persistent grief is irrational due to its prolonged duration. However, I challenge this view, arguing that persistent grief is not necessarily irrational for the following reasons. First, there are sometimes fitting reasons for its prolonged duration: cognitive processes like intrusive memories and recollections often associated with persistent grief can justify its persistence. Secondly, there are sometimes pragmatic reasons for its distinctively prolonged duration. Pragmatic reasons, which refer to the practical benefits of having an emotion, can also serve as normative reasons that justify the continuation of the emotion. If one's having persistent grief has pragmatic benefits and serves a certain function, it is not necessarily irrational for the agent to have it.

DEBUNKING AND THE FUNCTION(S) OF MORAL COGNITION – Noah McKay
Evolutionary debunking arguments aim to show that moral realism leads to moral skepticism when conjoined with evolutionary theory. There is much controversy about how best to formulate these arguments. I explore the prospects for a new formulation, which I call the "telic strategy". The telic strategy aims to show that the evolved components of moral cognition have non-alethic functions – that is, functions unrelated to grasping truth. I raise a difficulty for the telic strategy: in order to succeed, telic debunking arguments must invoke strong claims about the evolved functions of moral cognition, claims that cannot be justified by appeal to the empirical evidence currently available. Though current science suggests that moral cognition has some non-alethic functions, this is compatible with the claim that one of the functions of moral cognition is to grasp moral truth.

Against Explanatory Orthodoxy: All Predictions are Explanations – Joseph Blado
Explanatory orthodoxy says that not all (accurate) predictions are explanations. After all, using the relevant scientific laws, we can for example predict the height of a flagpole using its shadow length and predict a simple pendulum's length using its period. But the shadow length of a flagpole hardly *explains* the flagpole's height, and the simple pendulum's length hardly *explains* its period. So, not all (accurate) predictions are explanations. This is a highly intuitive and plausible position. However, despite the orthodox position's plausibility, this paper argues the reasons to believe this thesis are surprisingly not as compelling as they initially seem.

Misgendering, Contextualism, and Disagreement – James Murphy
Contextualists about gender terms hold that the meaning of words like "man" and "woman" varies from context to context. This view is standardly motivated by the uncontroversial observation that people use gender terms in different ways: some use them to track biological features, others to track gender identity. These different patterns of usage, contextualists argue, reflect different meanings of gender terms. In this paper, I argue that we should reject contextualism about gender terms because it leaves us unable to adequately explain the disagreement between trans-inclusive and trans-exclusionary speakers. I develop and defend an alternative, non-contextualist explanation of the varying usage of gender terms rooted in the work of Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge. According to the non-contextualist account I defend, speakers in different contexts use gender terms differently because they have different theories of gender categories, but they mean the same thing by their gender terms.

Filling in the Details about Explanatory Abstraction – Cory Wright
Abstraction is the intentional omission of details, whereas completion involves their incorporation. These practices are widespread in mechanistic explanation; however, an intra-mechanist debate has occurred over whether, or to what extent, explanatory completion is a norm. Craver & Kaplan argue that so-called 'Salmon-completeness' provides just such an ideal constraint. Unfortunately, Salmon-completeness cannot formally do the work that Craver & Kaplan intend it to. And, empirically, there are cases in which models explain better without recourse to the details, such as the causal and constitutive role of glial cells in working memory.

Responding to all the popular objections using David Chalmers' works – Kiet Nguyen
This paper will examine whether a meaningful life can be lived within virtual reality (VR) environments. Building on David Chalmers' arguments, I will explores the potential for VR to offer experiences that are just as authentic and valuable as those in the physical world. Key objections are considered, including concerns about the artificiality of VR, the nature of meaningful experiences, and the risk of detachment from reality. The paper argues that VR can support meaningful lives, provided it fosters genuine emotional connections, immersive coherence, and personal fulfillment. By expanding traditional views of meaningful existence, this analysis suggests that virtual environments may play a significant role in shaping the future of human experience.

Defective to be Effective-Conceptual Defects as Part of the Cognitive Economy – Jiusi Guo
The present work proposes that defects in human concepts, analogous to heuristics in vision, are essential for cognitive efficiency. These defects enable concepts to function effectively within our cognitive limits and therefore do not necessarily require any repair. This work calls

conceptual engineers' attention to the largely overlooked pragmatic constraint on their practices and imposes a system-wide condition on the field.