Indiana Philosophical Association

Fall 2017 Meeting at Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, 10-11 November 2017

Meeting Program

Friday, 10 Nov	Session A Wilmeth Active Learning Center (WALC) 1121	Session B Wilmeth Active Learning Center (WALC) B091
9:00-9:30	*Registration* (Outside of WALC 1121)	
	18th and 19th Century Chair: Alex Gillham (Purdue University)	**The Self** Chair: Elizabeth Williams (Indiana University)
9:30-10:25 Speaker: Commenter:	Kant's Anticipations of Perception on a Representational Reading Andrew Roche (Centre College) Aaron Wells (University of Notre Dame)	A Pragmatic Methodology for the (Queer) Self Elaine M. Blum (Purdue University) Rachel Jonker (University of Notre Dame)
10:30-11:25 Speaker: Commenter:	Nietzsche's Critique of Stoicism: Passion, Suffering, and Revaluation James Mollison (Purdue University) Ryan van Nood (Purdue University)	Resisting the Remnant-Person Problem Eric Yang (Santa Clara University) Scott Davison (Morehead State University)
11:30-12:25 Speaker: Commenter:	Pessimism Redux Walter Reid (Syracuse University) Sean Murphy (Indiana University)	Why Self-Promises are Problematic Alida Liberman (University of Indianapolis) Bertha Manninen (Arizona State University)
12:25-1:30	*Lunch*	
	Ancient Philosophy Chair: Andrew Roche (Centre College)	**Mind and Language** Chair: Levi Tenen (Indiana University)
1:30-2:25 Speaker: Commenter:	*Akrasia*'s Scope: The Sufficiency of Aristotelian Moral States to Combat Socratic Denial Samuel Bennett (Purdue University) Alex Gillham (Purdue University)	Phenomenal Concepts and the Science of Consciousness Dylan Black (Indiana University) Phil Woodward (Valparaiso University)
2:30-3:25 Speaker: Commenter:	The Z.13 Thesis and the Unity of Substance Tyler Eaves (University of Oklahoma) Joshua Gulley (Independent Scholar)	Can Abstract Objects Lay the Smack Down?: Professional Wrestling and Reference Nick Louzon (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign) David Patillo (University of Notre Dame)
3:30-5:30	Keynote Address, WALC 2007 # "There is No Moral *Ought* and No Prudential *Ought*" ## Elizabeth Harman Princeton University	
5:30	Dinner (to be arranged informally after the sessions)	

Saturday, 11 Nov	Session A WALC 2088	Session B WALC 3090
8:30-9	*Registration* (Outside of WALC 2088)	
	Special Session: Ancient Philosophy Chair: Rob Luzecky (IPFW)	**Special Session: Epistemology** Chair: Rachel Jonker (University of Notre Dame)
9-9:55 Speaker: Commenter:	Is Tranquility the Final Telos for Epicurus? Alex Gillham (Purdue University) Kevin S. Honeycutt (Mercer University)	Wrong-Right Reasoning Peter Murphy (University of Indianapolis) James Klimek (Independent Scholar)
10-10:55 Speaker: Commenter:	The Brotherhood of Nature in the Gorgias Kevin S. Honeycutt (Mercer University) Charlene Elsby (IPFW)	Wondering about What You Know Avery Archer (George Washington University) Matt Carlson (Wabash College)
11-11:55 Speaker: Commenter:	Against Empedoclean Teleology: The Roles of Love, Strife, and Chance Joshua Gulley (Independent Scholar) Tyler Eaves (University of Oklahoma)	Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters Liz Jackson (University of Notre Dame) Michael Hatcher (Valparaiso University)
11:55-12:45	*Lunch*	
12:45	*Student Awards Presentation*	
	Ethical and Aesthetic Value Chair: Charlene Elsby (IPFW)	**Special Session: Metaphysics** Chair: Tyler Eaves (University of Oklahoma)
1-1:55 Speaker: Commenter:	What If God Makes Hard Choices? Paul Draper (Purdue University) Eric Yang (Santa Clara University)	Four-Dimensionalism's Grounding Problem: Temporary and Permanent Coincidence Kirsten Welch (Western Michigan University) Ernani Magalhaes (Independent Scholar)
2-2:55 Speaker: Commenter:	Princess Diana's Dress, Mink Coats, and Nature: Reasons for Valuing as Ends Levi Tenen (Indiana University) Luke Wilson (Purdue University)	Who's Afraid of Modal Collapse?: A Defense of Spinoza's Necessitarianism Brandon Rdzak (Purdue University) Dan Frank (Purdue University)
3-3:55 Speaker: Commenter:	Roman Ingarden's Ontology of the Picture Rob Luzecky (IPFW) Levi Tenen (Indiana University)	A Modalist Proposal David Patillo (University of Notre Dame) Dave Fisher (Indiana University)
4:00-5:00	*Executive Meeting*	

IPA Executive Officers 2017-2018:

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Vice President	Charlene Elsby, IPFW
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Abstracts of Presented Papers

Title: Wondering about What You Know
Author: Avery Archer
Abstract: According to Jane Friedman, attitudes like wondering, inquiring, and suspending judgement are question-directed. Call such attitudes *interrogative attitudes* (IAs). Friedman insists that all IAs are governed by an Ignorance Norm: Necessarily, if one knows Q at t, then one ought not have an IA towards Q at t. However, I argue that a central premise Friedman relies on in her argument actually undermines (rather than supports) the claim that IAs are not governed by the Ignorance Norm. I conclude that Friedman's conception of IAs should be rejected.

Title: Samuel Bennett
Author: *Akrasia*'s Scope: The Sufficiency of Aristotelian Moral States to Combat Socratic Denial
Abstract: Aristotle and Plato report that Socrates denies the moral state of *akrasia*'s possibility—that is, Socrates denies that moral agents make mistakes willingly, but rather asserts that they do so as a result of ignorance. Aristotle's account of *akrasia* in *Nicomachean Ethics* seems to refute Socrates' stance. However, Aristotle presents *akrasia* with a limited scope or reach, as a moral state concerned only with the objects of *sophrosune*. Thus we might conclude that Aristotle does not refute Socrates' position entirely, affirming *akrasia* as an actual moral state, but only when the objects of *sophrosune* are concerned. This conclusion is wrong, for Aristotle provides space for moral states distinct from *akrasia*-proper within the domains of virtues other than *sophrosune*. These moral states are distinguished from *akrasia*-proper in that they have different objects alongside their respective virtues, but similar in that they share a psychological explanation.

Title: Phenomenal Concepts and the Science of Consciousness
Author: Dylan Black
Abstract: Scientifically literate physicalists in the philosophy of mind often endorse the phenomenal concept strategy in response to the explanatory gap. Although defenders of the phenomenal concept strategy believe that phenomenal states are identical to physical/functional states, they generally deny the possibility that science can reveal the physical/functional identity of phenomenal states. In this paper I defend the consistency of the phenomenal concept strategy with the possibility that science will discover the physical/functional identity of phenomenal states. I argue that correct applications of phenomenal concepts imply that certain functional concepts apply, placing functional constraints on what might count as the neural correlates of consciousness. Specifically I propose that a cognitive process is a mental representation only if, under the right circumstances, it makes its content available to the cognitive systems to which it belongs.

Title: A Pragmatic Methodology for the (Queer) Self
Author: Elaine M. Blum

Abstract: The purpose of this project is to articulate an account of the self that recognizes the full range of its gendered embodiments. To do this, I commit myself to taking the lives and experiences of LGBTIA+ individuals as the starting point for theorizing, as well as the measure of success for my theorizing. My aim is to find a notion of self that does justice to the complexities and contradictions of queerness. My hypothesis is twofold. First, I argue that pragmatic methodologies, which emphasize the social self, achieve this aim. Second, not only does pragmatism do justice to queer lives, but it reveals that the self *itself is queer*. What it is to be, express, embody, or live as a self -- in *any* of its gendered embodiments -- is to be queer.

Title: What If God Makes Hard Choices?

Author: Paul Draper

Abstract: This paper explores the implications for classical theism of the possibility that God makes "hard choices." A choice between two actions is *hard* if the chooser believes that each action is better than the other in some respects, but believes neither that one action is better overall than the other nor that the two actions are equally valuable overall. Even an omniscient God might be forced to make hard choices if, as seems plausible, "better than," "worse than," and "equal in value to" do not exhaust the relevant value relations that one action can bear to another. This paper seeks to show that, if God does make hard choices of a certain sort, then God can be essentially perfectly rational and still have morally significant freedom. This is important because *maximal* praiseworthiness both requires morally significant freedom and, like perfect rationality, is required for divinity in the classical sense.

Title: The Z.13 Thesis and the Unity of Substance

Author: Tyler Eaves

Abstract: In *Metaphysics* Zeta 13, Aristotle appears to be arguing for a problematic conclusion. He appears to be arguing that no universal can be substance and this is problematic because two commonly held interpretations of Aristotle's metaphysics are that forms are substance—indeed they are the primary substances—and that forms are universal in that there is one form that, together with bits of matter, constitute the members of a given species of natural object. I will argue that this apparent inconsistency is just that—apparent—by offering reasons, from both internal and external to Z.13, for thinking that Aristotle has not contradicted himself at all and that what he says in Z.13 is quite in keeping with the larger theory of substance developed in the central books.

Title: Is Tranquility the Final Telos for Epicurus?

Author: Alex R Gillham

Abstract: Scholarly consensus takes Epicurus to posit tranquility as the final end. On this reading, all actions must aim toward the elimination of bodily pain and mental turmoil. If this is the final *telos,* then the state in which M finds herself simply cannot improve once M secures tranquility; to say that tranquility is the final *telos* is to say that once one achieves it, there is nothing more outside of it to seek. But it is mistaken to take Epicurus to posit tranquility as the final end of human actions. Since the gods can experience goods over and above tranquility, and since Epicurus exhorts humans to become godlike

by doing the same thing, tranquility cannot be the final *telos*. Both human and divine actions can aim at some end more final and complete than mere non-disturbance, which means that Epicurus cannot take tranquility to be the final *telos*.

Title: Against Empedoclean Teleology: The Roles of Love, Strife, and Chance

Author: Joshua Gulley

Abstract: Although Aristotle treats Empedocles as an opponent of teleological explanation, there are places in the fragments that seem to attribute teleological activity to Empedocles' cosmic forces, Love and Strife. This has led some interpreters to treat Empedocles as a teleologist. I challenge such teleological interpretations of Empedocles by examining key texts that seem to suggest teleology, arguing particularly that Empedocles' analogies are meant to show how order can emerge by chance as if it were purposefully arranged. Then, I provide an interpretation of Empedocles on chance to support an anti-teleological reading of Empedocles. Ultimately, I argue that chance emerges when earth, water, air, fire, and mortal mixtures act on their own, without the total control of the forces over them. Moreover, I suggest that such chancy activity, with Love's commitment to mixing unlikes in innumerably many ways, can explain how complex life forms can emerge without any planning.

Title: The Brotherhood of Nature in the *Gorgias*

Author: Kevin S. Honeycutt

Abstract: Recent scholarship on the *Gorgias* has tended to focus on the relationship between Socrates and Callicles. Some scholars have suggested a common ground between the Socratic and Calliclean positions; others have suggested instead that the two positions have little in common. In this essay, I attempt to supplement such interpretations by focusing on the theme of nature (*physis*) and by offering a reading of *Gorgias* 481b-486d, i.e., the two speeches by Socrates and Callicles, respectively, at the beginning of their interchange. I argue that insufficient attention has been paid to the strange format of Socrates' speech and to Callicles' understanding of nature. It is only when these topics have been examined that we are in the proper position to evaluate whether there are points of philosophical contact between Socrates and Callicles.

Title: Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters

Author: Liz Jackson

Abstract: In this paper, I argue that the relationship between belief and credence is a central question in epistemology. This is because the belief-credence relationship has significant implications for a number of current epistemological issues. I focus on three controversies: permissivism, disagreement, and pragmatic encroachment. I argue that the implications of each debate depend on whether the relevant attitude is belief or credence. This means that (i) epistemologists should pay attention to whether they are framing questions in terms of belief or in terms of credence and (ii) the success or failure of a reductionist project in the belief-credence realm has significant implications for epistemology generally.

Title: Why Self-Promises are Problematic

Author: Alida Liberman

Abstract: I argue that self-promises cannot be understood as genuine promises. First, the possibility of unilateral release from a self-promise undermines the force of the obligation. Allen Habib and Tim Oakley have each offered counter-examples to this argument. While these cases establish that *some* kinds of duties to the self are unproblematically waivable, they do not support the kind of release that is involved in cases of promises, which is release *at will.* I then defend the claim that promises involve release at will from an argument to the contrary from Connie Rosati. Second, I argue that the rational censure we apply to those who abandon self-promises is different in kind from the distinctively moral censure applied to those who break interpersonal promises, and I defend this claim against a different objection from Rosati. This shows us that self-promises and interpersonal promises are not fundamentally the same phenomena.

Title: Can Abstract Objects Lay the Smack Down?: Professional Wrestling and Reference
Author: Nick Louzon
Abstract: This paper raises questions about fictional characters and reference on a Kripkean account that claims that talk of fictional characters is either about abstract objects or pretended persons within a pretense. Examples common to professional wrestling cause a problem for this account. The given semantics does not explain why some apparently true sentences cannot be analyzed in a way that captures what the speaker seems to be saying. I argue that the *Pretense Principle* acts as an implicature-generating framework in which the apparent truth of these sentences can be explained by implicatures generated by presupposing the *Pretense Principle*.

Title: Roman Ingarden's Ontology of the Picture
Author: Rob Luzecky
Abstract: One of the primary results of Ingarden's ontology of the artistic painting (i.e., the "picture") is that its unique ontologically stratified structure implies an involvement with the viewer that suggests a type of life. In the present paper, I elucidate Ingarden's ontology of the picture in order to 1) clarify Ingarden's modification of Husserl's remarks about paintings, and 2) demonstrate that Ingarden's ontological analyses of the picture present yield the conclusion that the picture enjoys a peculiar kind of life.

Title: Nietzsche's Critique of Stoicism: Passion, Suffering, and Revaluation
Author: James Mollison
Abstract: Nietzsche criticizes Stoicism for undervaluing the passions, especially suffering, and for mistaking their characteristic disposition for a universal ethical ideal. I unpack these criticisms in four sections. First, I argue that Nietzsche targets those Stoics who understand the passions as cognitive judgments. I then narrow his objections by showing that he shares the Stoics' cognitivist view of the passions, admits the efficacy of extirpating the passions, and shares their denial of external goods' intrinsic value, while insisting on suffering's instrumental value. Third, I show that Nietzsche's chaotic view of nature justifies his normative anti-realism and suggest this, combined with his cognitivist view of

value, leads to normative fictionalism, where values are adopted for pragmatic reasons. He thus objects to Stoic virtue on meta-ethical and practical grounds. Lastly, I suggest that suffering is instrumental for value-creation because it inspires mistrust of our most precious beliefs while demanding alternative accounts of meaning.

Title: Wrong-Right Reasoning
Author: Peter Murphy
Abstract: Sometimes when we reason from some of our beliefs to a new belief, the following is something that we know to be true: even if one of the former premise-beliefs turns out to be mistaken, our new conclusion-belief might still be true. I call this wrong-right reasoning and I contrast it with wrong-wrong reasoning. With the second, a person knows of one of her pieces of reasoning that if one of her premise-beliefs turns out to be mistaken, then her conclusion-belief will also be mistaken. I give examples of each kind. Then I offer some reason to think that we can use our knowledge that our reasoning is wrong-right reasoning to get an additional boost in the degrees to which the relevant conclusion-beliefs are justified. I also highlight a surprising feature of the self-doubt that is involved in using our knowledge that our reasoning is wrong-right reasoning in this way.

Title: A Modalist Proposal
Author: David Patillo
Abstract: In this paper, I present a theory of possible worlds which allows for an easy distinction between truth in and at worlds but which also is consistent with S5 modal logic. On this view, there are worlds at which "Socrates does not exist" and "possibly Socrates exists" are both true, without violating actualism or existentialism. I consider two arguments that such a world is impossible and show that they in fact turn on quotational or diquotational principles which are easily deniable. I then consider the Lewisian objection that these worlds would be incomplete and argue that while there may be some intuitive sense in which they are incomplete, there are not and could not be possibilities that they failed to represent, so they are entirely adequate for modal analysis.

Title: Who's Afraid of Modal Collapse?: A Defense of Spinoza's Necessitarianism
Author: Brandon Rdzak
Abstract: According to Spinoza's doctrine of necessitarianism, all truths are metaphysically necessary and none are contingent, or equivalently, there is only one metaphysically possible world: the actual one. The general consensus on Spinoza's necessitarianism is that it is wildly untenable. But apart from commentators pointing out the highly counter-intuitive nature of the view, surprisingly little has been said to explain exactly why it is so implausible. Recently, however, Martin Lin has filled that explanatory gap. He powerfully argues that Spinoza's necessitarianism entail the loss of indispensible philosophical distinctions, such as that between (i) essences and accidents, (ii) lawlike and accidental generalizations, and (iii) counterpossible and counterfactual conditionals. I argue that Lin's argument fails because Spinoza has ample resources to preserve distinctions (i)-(iii) regardless of his necessitarianism. In that case, Spinoza's necessitarianism may not be as implausible as commentators have generally assumed.

Title: Pessimism Redux

Author: Walter J. Reid

Abstract: Schopenhauer's pessimism holds that life is not worth living. *Suffering* and *Insufficient Value* are widely-cited reasons for pessimism. In Section One, I explicate whether suffering implies pessimism. Pessimism doesn't follow from suffering *per se*. Rather, suffering follows from there being insufficient value, i.e. nothing that is ultimately meaningful. In Section Two, then, I evaluate Schopenhauer's grounds for claiming there's insufficient value, his more fundamental reason for pessimism.   Current literature acknowledges a connection between insufficient value and pessimism, but hasn't developed that link thoroughly. I intend to develop that link, even argue in favor of it. Accordingly, my thesis is that the argument from insufficient value renders pessimism a viable stance to take within the contemporary debate concerning the value of human life.

Title: Kant's Anticipations of Perception on a Representational Reading

Author: Andrew F. Roche

Abstract: In this paper, I consider various problems that Kant's Anticipations of Perception, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, has been thought to face. In particular, I am interested in how to understand the role that synthesis plays in Kant's view of how we come to represent intensive magnitude in the world. I develop answers to the problems that I consider within the framework of what I call a *representational reading* of the Anticipations.

Title: Princess Diana's Dress, Mink Coats, and Nature: Reasons for Valuing as Ends

Author: Levi Tenen

Abstract: A number of philosophers argue that objects can have extrinsic final value, or be valuable as ends for their relation to things outside of them. I agree with these writers but argue that they have not shown *how* extrinsic features can render an object finally valuable. Christine Korsgaard, as well as Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, isolate extrinsic features that seem only to give us reason to value objects for the sake of something else, or *non-finally*. I suggest a solution: when we value one entity as an end, we might come to conceive of another object as being related to it in a non-instrumental, non-constitutive way— we might conceive of the object as *resembling* or as being *historically related* to the thing we already value as an end. In such cases, we might then have good reason to value the object for its own sake.

Title: Four-Dimensionalism's Grounding Problem: Temporary and Permanent Coincidence

Author: Kirsten Welch

Abstract: Grounding non-categorical properties stands as a significant difficulty for those who wish to maintain a three-dimensional view of how two objects can share the same spacio-temporal location without being identical. In this paper, I argue that the grounding problem also undermines four-dimensionalism. First, I explain the grounding problem and its relationship to the issue of temporary

coincidence, which is often leveled as an objection against three-dimensionalist views. Next, I discuss permanent coincidence, arguing that the grounding problem crops up for four-dimensionalists in this context. Finally, I return to the problem of temporary coincidence, suggesting that any four-dimensionalist answer to the problem of permanent coincidence undermines the typical solution four-dimensionalists offer to the problem of temporary coincidence. Although my argument does not demonstrate any inconsistency within the four-dimensionalist framework, I suggest that it ought to weaken the motivation for accepting four-dimensionalism as a theory of persisting objects.

Title: Resisting the Remnant-Person Problem
Author: Eric Yang
Abstract: Some opponents of animalism have offered a relatively new worry: the remnant-person problem. After presenting the problem, I lay out several responses and show why they are either problematic or come with significant theoretical costs. I then present my own response to the problem, which unlike the other responses, is one that can be adopted by animalists of any stripe. What I hope to show is that some of the key assumptions of the remnant-person problem can be rejected, and thus the remnant-person problem should be seen as posing no threat to animalism.