

SPRING MEETING: INDIANA PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION (FINAL NOTICE)

Date: Saturday, April 11, 1970

Place: Indiana University, Bloomington

Program:	9:30 a.m. - 10:30 a.m.	Coffee and doughnuts
	10:30 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.	Paper: "Worlds without Good or Yellow" Eva Cadwallader, Indiana University
	12:30 p.m. - 1:30 p.m.	Luncheon
	1:30 p.m. - 2:30 p.m.	Paper by undergraduate member of the IPA: "The Apology and Crito: Socrates and the Limits of Civil Disobedience", John Barton Bridge, Wabash College
	2:30 p.m. - 3:30 p.m.	Business meeting
	3:30 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.	Paper: "Creation" Prof. John Donnelly, U. of Notre Dame

The meeting room is the State Room East (on the second floor of the Indiana Memorial Union Building). Coffee and doughnuts will be served there.

Luncheon: The north area of the cafeteria (on the ground floor of the Memorial Union Building) will be reserved for those attending the IPA meeting.

Parking: There is a large parking area immediately to the north of the Union Building where members of the IPA may park their cars, for a relatively small fee, throughout the day.

Abstracts of Mrs. Cadwallader's and Professor Donnelly's papers are enclosed, as is also a map of the Bloomington campus.

ABSTRACTS OF PAPERS

Worlds without Good or Yellow

This paper will be presented in an experimental mood, with the intention of evoking a somewhat different type of audience involvement during its discussion from that which is probably customary. The departure will result from the fact that the question for discussion, viz., What is simplicity of qualia? is a question raised not in but by the paper.

The content of the paper represents a thought experiment undertaken with a view towards conceptualizing what it would be like to "drop" first yellow, and then good, out of the universe. The thesis is defended that radically different types of changes in our actual world would have to be made in order to create the yellow-less as opposed to the good-less possible worlds. (Two fundamentally different senses of 'good' are distinguished and dealt with for this purpose.) This enterprise was inspired by an effort to take a new approach toward understanding what G.E. Moore's famous claim that "good is like yellow" in being "simple and unanalyzable" might come to.

After the paper has been read, active participation of the audience will be invited in a Socratic-like exploration of questions clustering about the issue: What is simplicity in this context? Is it, e.g., ontological? phenomenological? logical? epistemological? Has the construction-of-possible-worlds technique any relevance for this question?

Eva Cadwallader
Indiana University

Creation

Is there a logic of creation? Can any sense be given to the expression "God created the world ex nihilo"? To most contemporary philosophers, including those of a theistic persuasion, the answer is indeed a negative one. However, my paper intends to show that philosophers have been too hasty in settling the issue, and that moreover, the creationist (i.e., a philosopher who accepts the proposition "God created the world ex nihilo" and all that it entails) can present a defence that amounts to more than theological pleading.

My paper is divided into five parts. In part I, I examine the heterogeneous concept of efficient causality, and attempt to formulate, in terms of quantification theory, a sense of creatio ex nihilo. In part II, I consider the Carnapian objection as to how the creationist can meaningfully speak of something coming from nothing, and attempt to clarify some conceptual difficulties intrinsic to the term "nothing". A distinction is drawn between (1) acts of creation in the loose and popular sense, and (2) acts of creation in the strict and philosophical sense, and arguments are offered against certain philosophers (e.g., Geach, McCloskey, etc.) who so abrogate the distinction by assimilating God's creative activity to the model of (1).

In part III, I treat the objection raised by certain philosophers (e.g., Russell, Ryle, etc.) that to talk of the "creation of the universe" is to commit a category mistake, inasmuch as in Kantian terminology, the universe is not an intelligible object in itself. In part IV, I confront the issue of divine transcendence and explore the Thomistic thesis that, while there is a "real relationship" between creatures and God, there is only a "relation of reason" between God and creatures, and offers a series of arguments to bolster this claim in light of contemporary criticism. Lastly, in part V, I consider a sophisticated argument raised by Richard Taylor, which, if assimilated to the problem of creation ex nihilo, would have the effect of negating God's causal efficacy, and jeopardizing the doctrine of ontological dependence.

John Donnelly
University of Notre Dame